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Wiofhurng
The most common confusion is over the definition of free will. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett "debated" the subject for months, even though they weren't talking about the same thing. See Marcus Geduld's answer to Free Will: What are the differences between Sam Harris's determinism and Dan Dennett's compatibalism? Which do you agree with and why? Here are the top-two definitions I hear: (1) we have free will if we make our choices internally, un-forced by any immediately-present external coercion. It doesn't matter whether or not those internal choices are determined or not. If they're ours (e.g. no one is pointing a gun to our heads), they're free. (2) we only have free will if there's some "mechanism" in our brains that is unaffected by the chain-of-causation which started with the Big Bang. (A random decision-maker doesn't count.) The second-most common confusion is this: "If free will doesn't exist, should we stop punishing criminals?" The problem is the word "should." If you ask whether or not you should do something, that implies you have a choice. No one asks, "Should I grow a second head?" because we know we can't. The confused idea behind that question is that we should use our free will to choose whether or not to punish criminals who don't have free will. But, of course, if free will doesn't exist, we can't have it, either. So we will or won't punish them, depending on what we're determined do do. In case that's unclear, I'll try explaining it another way: if we agree free will is an illusion, we don't ask, "Should a thief choose to rob someone or not?" So why are we asking whether we should choose to punish the thief or not? If there's no free will, then the Universe is like a clockwork machine in which the criminal is programmed to commit his crime and we're programmed to punish him, to not punish him, or whatever. We get confused about this because it's much easier to imagine someone else lacking free will than ourselves. We do it all the time when we watch zombie movies. We could ask, "Since zombies don't have free will, should we (who do have it) punish them?" That makes sense. We could also imagine discovering a planet, inhabited by beings without free will. If we (who have free will) visit that planet, should we punish its criminals? That's an analogy for what's going on in our heads when we ask, "If free will doesn't exist, should we punish criminals?" Here's a different scenario: a troop of robots, without free will, land on the planet of criminals-without-free-will. Should the robots-without-free-will (who are programmed to punish the criminals) choose whether or not to punish the criminals? Even determined brains might choose, in the sense of going through a deliberating process, considering options A and B, and choosing B. If free will is an illusion, then that whole process, including its result (B) is pre-programmed. So we can define the word "choice" so that it's meaningful, even without free will: it's the process of generating an output from an input. But that doesn't help us with the criminal question, because using the above definition, we get, "When a thief considers stealing or not stealing and winds up making the choice he was programmed to make, should we make the choice we're programmed to make or some other choice?" -- As Marcus Geduld explains, it doesn't really matter. If we have free will, the moral implication is that we should choose to try to do better, punish criminals, work harder, etc. If we do not have free will, it doesn't matter because (as he points out) our punishment of the criminals is pre-determined and as much a part of the process as their committing of crimes. Doesn't matter. We just keep chugging along. I prefer to operate under the assumption that we have free will (as a general guide) but that free will is fluid. It comes and goes hourly, daily, etc. It exists as a gradient that may at times be maximum and others, non-existent. As Marcus points out, we get into a very tricky position when we try to nail down what free will is. If it comes from some drive inside us, is it free will? If it's caused by environmental pressures, is it free will? And what is free will anyway? I can't live without the environmental pressures of the four fundamental interaction, for example. I'm not "free" of them no matter how hard I try. I cannot fly. I cannot separate atoms. I cannot do a lot of things. Why are the things that are within my mental and physical ken considered "free" but not casting a spell or shooting friggin lazers out of my eyes? What defines that which falls within the acceptable range of "free will" and why are those things free and not those other things that I see happening in scifi movies? So, if we constrain "free will" to that which is possible within the confines of physics, we're still left with a lot of things I must or must not do. I cannot drink arsenic. I cannot breathe under water (and clearly, breathing under water is a physical possibility). I must have oxygen saturated air in my lungs. I must eat nourishing foods. I'm never far from hunger, thirst, hypothermia, hypoxia, etc. I'm not free of them -- they follow me every second of every day of my life. Okay. Fine, we have those constraints. Those are "survival" constraints. But how do I know those are survival constraints? Because I'm programmed to know them. I've inherited those biologically. My hunger for sweets is so powerful that it's an addiction. In past people, it drove them to survive and seek carbohydrates (as energy of the brain). But in a land of plenty or refined carbohydrates, I lack the ability to control my eating especially if I'm alone with them. I'm a food addict. Do I not have free will? Well, it's fluid. If I'm in a group of people, the balancing of shame from looking like a glutton triggers an opposing influence that stops me from doing so. But alone in my house, if it's there, I'll eat it to sickness. I can't have that in my home. My brain is programmed to want sweets, and that coupled with my highly addictive personality means that my brain's "I need this for survival" mechanism overrides my self control. This is what happens with addicts. I'm an addict. I used meth, coke and ecstasy for years. Meth was really my downfall. After having my mid-brain rewired, it sent impulses to the rest of my brain that the meth was as important for my survival as air or food or water. We know this is true because of really cruel experiments done on rats, dogs and other animals. They were "addicted" to a stimulus to their brain. After becoming overridden by the addiction, their mid-brain simply satiated thirst and hunger with "more pressing of this button thingy". The pain of hunger was resolved not by eating, but by pressing the "pleasure stimulus" button. When the pain of thirst struck, they pressed the "pleasure stimulus" button instead of drinking. Eventually the animals literally thirsted themselves to death even while food and water sat next to them. That's not free will and we know that animals don't typically have what we call "free will". We might have it, but we don't know quite how to describe it. But suffice it to day, free will -- if it exists at all -- is a fluid state that adjusts depending on external stimuli. I don't have free will to avoid thirst, or I die. That's the "threat of a gunman" next to me. I don't have a rational choice. I don't have free will to do something if a murderer has a knife at my throat. Free will, like most things (again, if it exists) is a gradient, fluid state. It shifts; it increases and decreases depending on pressures both internally and externally. The problem is, is understanding ''when ''an and ''how ''those pressures change; when X is too much and goes beyond the individual's control. I've learned a few of my "last points of control" to make sure I don't enter into situations where I lose free will, but the potential for having it lost (or gained) is still there. It's fluid and it's never absolute.